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THE QUESTION
From Maastricht on, how did fiscal authorities (FAs) 
deal with the two objectives of output stabilization
and debt consolidation? 
To answer this question, we need a measure of the 
fiscal stance, in order to single out discretionary 
fiscal policy.
Fiscal stance = variation of the primary budget (fiscal 
impulse), to accomplish the target for total budget. 
1) “Neutral measure”: CAPB  Fiscal stance
2) “Theory-based” measure: Fiscal rules  Fiscal 
stance
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Solving for bt-1 , and iterating for the subsequent periods, after k 
iterations we get :
Intertemporal Public Budget constraint
Fiscal  Sustainability (public debt stock equalized 
by the future stream of net surpluses)
• The “transversality condition” is met when  the second 
term converges to zero as time approaches to infinite 
(κ∞): 
• The present value of future surpluses must equalize, 
in each period t , the stock of public debt (bt): 
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• The fulfilment of the Transversality condition (TC) is a dynamic 
optimization problem. 
• The second term becomes nil for k ∞, which guarantees that 
public debt will not accumulate. Formally, by taking a t+k
horizon version of the problem of maximizing the present value, 
we obtain the F-O condition for t+k, and then the limit of this 
condition is taken as k goes to infinity (Bohn, 1998).
• Still the first term of TC could be < bt due to (i - g)<0. Yet, 
even a diminishing width of future surpluses (v) warrants FS, as
the IPBC would not be fulfilled only in the non-realistic case in 
which the output level falls below the formation of fiscal 
revenues, which is preposterous.
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Macroeconomic governance in the EMU
(1) AD:
(2) AS:
(3)     CB’s loss function:
(4)    P. Budget: 
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where ψ between 0 (medium-term target: ds) and 1 (a.s.); ŝ (the budget’s 
elasticity after a output deviation from pot.) measures the capacity of a.s. to 
absorb O.G.: (y). All variables are deviations from the baseline.
(5) FAs’ loss function
where β2 is the weight for stabilization beyond pot. output  (y* > 0). To avoid a 
“deficit bias”, similar to the “inflation bias”, the design of the SGP points to β2
= 0 (NO “discretionary” f.p.). During the cycles (y ≠ 0), ψ=1 allows for the 
operation of automatic stabilizers (a.s.) during output fluctuations. SGP: ds=0 
in the medium-term is the condition for a.s. to fully operate  when y ≠ 0, and 
FAs comply with:
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d^ = 3% limit and ε = neg.shock:  0 = -3 - (- 3)(6)
The ds/GDP ratio depends on g and ∆ i 
Hence, in equilibrium the structural deficit is: 
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where iLP is the long-run interest rate and the value of β1 reflects 
the “smoothing” interest rate in the monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions meant to pursuing the desired inflation-output trade-
off.  
By substituting (4) in (1) and solving for y: 
(10) CB’s loss function
(11)
Hypotheses: in the absence of inflation expectations (pie=0) the CB 
pursues “zero inflation” under REH (pi = pie=0 ); with no AD shocks: 
µ1=0 , so that y=0, the actual output = potential output ,and the 
structural deficit / GDP ratio = 0 in the medium-term:
(12)
A direct relation holds between the i rate and the structural balance / GDP
(13)
1) CAPB
The variation of the fiscal stance is measured 
through the so-called “structural” primary 
balance: 
the cyclically-adjusted public budget (the value 
that the public budget would have assumed “if 
the output level would have not changed”) 
minus 
the exogenously determined amount of interest 
payments (the stock of public debt, times the 
interest rate determined by financial markets 
and monetary policy). 
1) CAPB measure of discretionary fiscal policy
Fiscal impulse: the value of the primary budget 
minus the estimate of the cyclically-originated
variation of primary budget. In other words, the 
variation of the fiscal stance by FAs is
computed as a residual. 
No role for the effective “room for manouvre” of 
FAs: the impact of the cycle (∆Y) is cancelled 
out, and no reverse causation of public budget 
on Y is envisaged. 
The CAPB is unable to offer a clear evaluation of 
the FAs’ behaviour, as it does not express the 
accountability of FAs.
2) Fiscal stance simulation
By using the “Growth Accounting” (the 
contribution of growth to the total balance / 
GDP ratio; von Hagen and Bruckner, 2002), I 
assess discretional fiscal policy as depending 
on the FISCAL RULE adopted by FAs. To the 
year-by-year flow of fiscal revenues, the fiscal 
reaction implied by two different fiscal rules are 
subtracted, and then set as the dependent 
variables in regressions in which output 
stabilization and debt decumulation play the 
role of independent variables.
“Simulated” fiscal impulses, computed 
according to the requirements of a certain 
fiscal rule: ∆ Fiscal Stance : + means that not all
revenues are spent (restriction), - means a larger
amount of expenses w.r. to revenues (expansion)
This approach permits to cast light on a variety
of possible causes for an “excessive” fiscal
expansion: 
1) lack of “fiscal discipline”, but also:
2) unforeseen negative g 
3) a rise in the interest rate 
4) a fall of the fiscal multiplier
5) a medium-term slow-down in potential output. 
• Tax Smoothing (TS)
Fiscal policy can smooth the business cycle but
cannot influence the GDP trend. The structural
total public budget must be kept at its medium-
term balanced position, with a fiscal expansion
in bad times and a fiscal retrenchment in good
times. However, to maintain the zero budget 
balance over the cycle at a constant τ is taken
by the SGP as the FAs commitment to cope
with the total (not only the primary) budget, 
which amounts to take responsability for any
positive (i – g) difference.
EMU: the SGP and Tax Smoothing
• Tax Smoothing requires a 
constant τ be preserved 
over the cycle. 
Governments should 
abstain from discretionary 
fiscal policy and just “let 
automatic stabilizers 
work” over the cycle
• Similarly, the SGP
dictating a zero structural 
deficit / GDP ratio in the 
medium-term is meant for 
preserving a constant  τ
• The Tax Smoothing and  
the SGP do not consider 
that g and iB are decisive 
for the transversality
condition of fiscal 
sustainability to be fulfilled.
• Due to exposure of the total 
balance/GDP to ∆g and ∆i, 
in the EMU fiscal
sustainability is not credibly 
enforced, as it relies on the 
evaluation of the public 
budget’s eligibility of each 
country to the pecuniary 
penalty for “excessive 
deficit”.
• Expenditure smoothing (ES)
Though the NKE is skeptical about the 
relevance of the fiscal multiplier for
macroeconomic equilibrium,
to prevent hysteresis after a negative shock, 
that is a pro-cyclical fiscal stance to worsen a 
sluggish growth, the public budget should
maintain constancy with potential growth;
in addition, pro-ciclicity during upswing should
not be banned, as excess fiscal revenues could
be intertemporally redistributed in order to raise
potential output (Y*>Ypot.).
Fiscal rules
• ∆vTS = ∆vt - [λ 1 τ t-1(g - g*) + λ 2 γt-1 (g – g*) ] – iB/Y 
(during a downswing, λ 1 = 0 ; λ 2 = 1)
• ∆vES = ∆vt’ - [λ 3 γt-1 (g – g*) ] – iB/Y
(during a downswing, λ 3 = 1)
• where
and ∆vt’ = τ t-1g - γt-1 g*
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“Counterfactual” regressions
• TS = C + α1 output gapi,t + α2 debti,t-1 + 
α3 (i-i*)i,t + α4 Zi,t + εi,t
• ES = C + β1 output gapi,t + β2 debti,t-1 + β3
(i-i*)i,t + β4 Zi,t + εi,t
• where output gap is ∆Y/Y*, debtt-1 is 
(B/Y),t-1, (i-i*) is the difference between 
each country long term interest rate minus 
the German one, and Z is a vector of 
dummy variables
Table 5 – Tax Smoothing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Constant 
 
-1.066**     
(0.489) 
-1.377*    
(0.652) 
1.880**    
(0.883) 
1.727*     
(0.959) 
0.144*     
(0.095)   
-2.651**      
(1.449) 
output gap -15.786***      
(4.711) 
-12.940***      
(3.018) 
-11.376*      
(6.291) 
-7.111*      
(3.736) 
-13.088***      
(3.878) 
-7.299***      
(1.034) 
Debt t-1 8.353*** 
(0.803) 
9.903***      
(1.901) 
4.163***      
(1.686) 
4.378***      
(1.699) 
7.029***     
(1.686) 
7.611***      
(2.465) 
i-i* 0.987***   
(0.139) 
1.126***    
(0.176) 
0.571*** 
(0.064) 
0.647***     
(0.264) 
0.811***  
(0.110) 
1.360***  
(0.202) 
High debt 1.515***    
(0.064) 
1.127***      
(0.069) 
2.891***     
(0.655) 
2.179**     
(0.816) 
2.019***     
(0.565) 
2.866***  
(0.510) 
N 287 269 123 105 203 185 
Time  1980-04 1980-04 1980-92 1980-92 1980/98 1980/98 
Adj-R2 0.894  0.949  0.921  
p-value 
over id. χ2 
 0.521  0.266  0.637 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 6 – Expenditure Smoothing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Constant 
 
-1.840*      
(0.662) 
-1.110*      
(0.421) 
-2.369*      
(0.804) 
-2.153**      
(0.669) 
2.665**   
(0.692) 
3.615***      
(0.996) 
Output gap -6.314***      
(1.214) 
-6.300***      
(1.189) 
-13.021***   
(4.310) 
-11.245***   
(3.117) 
-8.769***     
(2.877) 
-8.435*** 
(42.84) 
Debt t-1 -9.339***   
(2.850) 
-9.587***   
(2.411) 
-11.259***      
(2.172) 
-12.569***      
(2.461) 
-15.624***    
(4.899) 
-13.633***      
(3.147) 
i-i* -1.059***     
(0.154) 
-0.899***     
(0.113) 
-1.893***   
(0.469) 
-1.794***   
(0.419) 
-1.256***    
(0.262) 
-2.056** 
(0.577) 
High debt 0.473*     
(0.238) 
0.622**     
(0.117) 
-6.228      
(5.106) 
-5.142      
(4.881) 
5.962   
(4.148) 
4.108    
(7.125) 
N 287 269 123 105 203 185 
Time 1980-04 1980-04 1980-92 1980-92 1980/98 1980/98 
Adj-R2 0.762  0.772  0.733  
p-value 
over id. χ2 
 0.761  0.367  0.557 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Regression results: 1980-92;93-98;99-04
• IV to cope with endogeneity problem (reverse 
causation)  two lags of output gap and (i-i*) as 
instruments. P-value: non-rejection area.OLS
coefficients : upward bias. 
• O.G.: the negative sign = “pro-cyclicity”. “Deviation” 
from the TS rule (there was NO revenues’
accumulation in upswings to comply with τ
constant); “loyalty” to the ES rule (fiscal expansion in 
upswings, keeping the primary balance / trend GDP
constant). Declining coefficients from EMS (1980-
92) to the pre-EMU (1980-98), to the  EMU (1980-
04) decreasing “pro-cyclicity”
• Lagged Debt and i differential: opposite signs for the 
two Fiscal Rules
Concluding remarks
The CAPB cannot be taken as a synonimous of 
“discretionary fiscal policy”. FAs’ fiscal impulses
can be “biased” by a positive (i - g) difference
and/or by a fall in potential output. From
econometric estimates conducted on post-
Maastricht Europe, where the two objectives
are regressed on the fiscal stance variation
computed by the TS and the ES fiscal rule
some important conclusions follow.
1) In the EMU countries who stick to the TS Fiscal 
Rule declining coefficients in the negative 
correlation  between OG and the fiscal impulse do 
not mean that a “less pro-cyclical” (Gali-Perotti, 
2004) fiscal stance in bad times has been pursued 
after Maastricht, but just lower discretion in 
upswings, due to the need to comply with the 
debt/GDP < 60% objective. Hence, debt 
decumulation was substituted to output 
stabilization.
2) In the “high debt” EMU countries who stick to the 
ES Fiscal Rule, the objective of debt decumulation
cannot be pursued.
